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Unemployment among semi- and unskilled workers has reached severe
proportions (over 50 %) and threatens the political and economic stability of the
South African economy. In this paper a computable general equilibrium (CGE)
model of the South African economy to assess the economy-wide impact of a
wage subsidy targeted at semi- and unskilled workers. We …nd that employment
of semi- and unskilled workers can be raised quite signi…cantly, although the
…nancial costs can be substantial. The targeting of the correct sectors as well as
the budgetary process (de…cit …nanced versus balanced budget) followed play an
important role in the outcome.
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1 Introduction
The extent of unemployment in South Africa has been extensively debated
(Bhorat and Leibbrandt, 1996; Standing et al., 1996; Nattrass, 2000). De-
pending onwhether the ‘strict’ or ‘expanded’ de…nitionis used, the measured
unemployment rate ranges between 25% and 40%. Despite the controversy
surrounding the correct measurement of unemployment it is widely accepted
that unemployment in South Africa is high compared to international stan-
dards and that it currently poses a serious threat to the political and eco-
nomic stability in South Africa. Many of the country’s social problems such
as poverty, crime, violence, a loss of morale, social degradation, and politi-
cal and economic instability can be linked to unemployment (Kingdon and
Knight, 2000).
Various factors have contributed to the unemployment problem in South
Africa. Economic growth deteriorated consistently during the 1970s, 1980s
and the early 1990s and had a substantial negative impact on employment
growth (Fallon and Pereira da Silva, 1994). However, employment contin-
ued to fall during the late 1990s, a period of improved economic growth,
suggesting that economic growth is only one of a range of factors in‡uenc-
ing employment. The decline in the capacity of economic growth to gen-
erate employment is partly due to strategic economic policies of the past
which have raised the capital intensity of production. In an e¤ort to become
self-sustained, capital-intensive industries enjoyed tax breaks and could bor-
row at lower interest rates, thus reducing the relative price of capital. This
has caused both a rise in the capital intensity of production within …rms
throughout the economy as well as a re-allocation of investment towards
highly capital-intensive sectors like the chemical sector (Levy, 1992; Fallon
and Pereira da Silva, 1994; Kaplinsky, 1995).
Past policies of discrimination and educational inequalities have also con-
tributed greatly to the structural unemployment problem in this country.
The level of educational attainment has been shown to be one of the most
important determinants of an individual’s employment status with the ma-
jority of unemployed persons having no skills or job training (Bhorat and
Leibbrandt, 1996). This is also re‡ected in current unemployment …gures:
50.1 % of semi- and unskilled labour were unemployed in 1999, compared
to 16.2% of skilled labour and zero percent of highly skilled workers (Lewis,
2001).
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sectors duringthe 1990s also suggest thepresenceof skill-biased-technological
change. Bhorat and Hodge (1999) and Edwards (2002) …nd that rising
skill intensity of production within industrial sectors rather than changes
in the sectoral composition of production are driving the overall increase
in the skill intensity of production. This trend is similar to other develop-
ing economies (Berman and Machin, 2000) and is commonly attributed to
skill-biased-technological change.
The structural nature of unemployment is one aspect of the problem. A
further important cause of unemployment, and one that is more important in
the context of this paper, is the sharp rise in the real cost of labour over the
last two decades. Much of the rising labour costs have been driven by sharp
real wage increases of semi- and unskilled workers. Lewis (2001) estimates
that the real wage of semi- and unskilled workers increased by 150% between
1970 and 1999. Real wages of highly skilled workers declined while those
of skilled workers rose by approximately 10% over the same period. 1At the
same time unemployment among semi- and unskilledworkers rosefrom below
10% in 1970 to over 50% in 1999. 2
Whilesimple correlationdoes not prove causation, there is growing econo-
metric evidence of a negative relationship between wages and employment
in South Africa (Fallon and Lucas, 1998; Fedderke and Mariotti, 2002). Es-
timates of the wage-employment elasticities range between -0.5 and -0.7.
Some of the decline in employment experienced since the 1980s can thus be
attributed to rising real wages.
Rising real wages are not the only cause of rising labour costs. Nattrass
(2000) argues that regulation in the labour market has impacted on employ-
ment levels by increasing the non-wage cost of employing labour. In a recent
survey of 325 large South African manufacturing …rms managers indicated
that, in response to new labour market legislation, they hired fewer workers,
substituted capital for labour when expanding, hired more temporary work-
ers asopposedto permanentworkers, andreliedon sub-contracting (Chandra
et al., 2001).
The textbook solution to the unemployment problem in South Africa is
1Edwards and Abdi (2001) use alternative survey data and also …nd evidence of rising
real wages of low-skilled labour during the 1980s and early 1990s.
2It must be noted that comparative …gures such as these should be analysed with
extreme caution. Prior to the 1990’s data from the former TBVC states were excluded
from most o¢cial statistics. This will bias estimates of unemployment during the 1980s
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to lower the wage of semi- and unskilled workers. However, there are some
practical (political and economical) limitations. Firstly, lowering wages is a
politically sensitive issue and may not feasibly be implemented. Secondly,
as Heintz and Bowles (1996) argue, it is possible to have unemployment in
the long run. Wages may already be so low that no positive wage rate exists
that clears the market. Thirdly, the e¢ciency wage argument maintains that
productivity may decline as a result of lower wages. This can be as a result
of nutritional reasons or a lack of incentive to work hard. Finally, wage
reductions do not solve for the structural constraints to employment growth.
In the long term these constraints need to be addressed through investment
in human capital.
Given these problems, one possible short run alternative to encouraging
wage reductions is the use of employment subsidies. The e¤ectiveness of
employment subsidies stems from the fact that they lower the wage rate faced
by the …rm while maintaining the real wage received by labour. Employment
subsidy schemes have been used widely to address declining employment
levels, both in developing and developed countries. Yet, fewresearchers have
explored the suitability of employment subsidy schemes for South Africa (see
Heintz and Bowles (1996) and Lewis (2001)). There is also interest from
policymakers and policy analysts to further investigate options relating to
the implementation of a wage subsidy scheme. After an initial proposal by
the National Government in the 2001 Budget Review for the implementation
of a ‘wage incentive scheme’, draft legislation for this scheme was released
early in 2002.3 Provision has also been made for the wage incentive scheme
to be extended to a wage subsidy scheme in the future. Further analysis is
thus pertinent.
This paper uses a Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) model for
South Africa to analyse the economy-wide impact of an employment subsidy
scheme. CGE models are employed extensively in policy analysis as they
simulate a market economy and serve as a useful tool to analyse “cross-
cutting issues” that have an economy-wide impact (Arndt and Lewis, 2000:
4). These models capture the interactions between markets and economic
agents while maintaining key macroeconomic balances. They can thus be
tailored around analysing speci…c issues such as the …nancing of the wage
subsidy scheme.
3The draft legislation released in February 2002 was a proposed insertion into Act 58
of 1962 (section 12H) and entitled “Deduction in respect of learnership agreements”.Wage subsidy scheme for South Africa 4
In the next section we explore issues relating to the theory and imple-
mentation of employment subsidies. Section 3 provides an overview of the
model with particular reference to structural features imposed to ensure ad-
equate representation of the South African economy. The results of various
simulations are compared in a comparative static fashion and are discussed
in section 4. Section 5 draws general conclusions.
2 Employment subsidies: Theory and implementation
2.1 Theory
Employment subsidies aim at expanding employment by reducing the cost
of labour to the employer. Typically the state subsidises the wage paid by
the …rm without lowering the wage received by the worker. This encourages
higher labour absorption by …rms, the direct employment e¤ect of the sub-
sidy (Heintz andBowles, 1996). Lewis (2001) describes a further direct e¤ect,
namely an accumulation e¤ect. This occurs when lower labour costs raise
expected pro…ts, which lead to increased capital investment. Employment is
also induced indirectly. Since more workers are employed, household income
increases, which in turn leads to an increase in consumption. At the same
time …rms are able to lower prices, thus increasing the real spending power
of households. Firms increase their output to satisfy higher consumption
demand, and hence demand more labour indirectly. Employment subsidies
therefore have various positive downstream e¤ects, which render them use-
ful to address a number of issues directly and indirectly, including poverty
alleviation, income redistribution, and the stimulation of private investment
and aggregate demand.
Standard producer theory can be used to show the impact of an employ-
ment subsidy on the employment level of the individual …rm. The …rm’s
short-run labour demand curve is given by the downward-sloping section of
the marginal revenue product (MRP) curve that falls below and to the right
of the average revenue product (ARP) curve. The …rm hires labour at the
point where the equilibrium wage, w¤, equals MRP. When the wage is re-
duced by a factor ± (± < 1) the …rm increases employment up to the point
where ±w¤ = MRP: In a perfectly competitive environment all …rms receiv-
ing the subsidy increase their demand for labour and hence the aggregateWage subsidy scheme for South Africa 5
labour demand curve shifts to the right.4 Katz (1998) uses a simple par-
tial equilibrium analysis to show the impact of a wage subsidy in the labour
market for unskilled workers (see Figure 1).
Figure 1 covers two scenarios. A supply-side constraint in the labour
market would suggest a horizontal supply of labour curve and hence a …xed
wage (left-handpanel). Awage subsidy causes the demand for labour to shift
to the right. As a result, total employment increases from L1 to L2, while
the wage remains constant. The employer bene…ts from a lower wage and
is able to use the extra ‘income’ from the subsidy to increase employment.
This has a positive e¤ect on overall poverty and unemployment. Aggregate
households receive a higher total income since there are fewer unemployed
household members. Furthermore, the expected wage ofunemployed persons,
de…ned as wage times the probability of …nding work, increases as a result
of the subsidy.
Alternatively, if the supply curve slopes upward (right-hand panel), the
individual worker’s wage will increase, thus counteracting the employment
e¤ect to some extent. The subsidy is shared between the worker and the
…rm. Under this scenario both the wage elasticity of supply and demand
for labour should be taken into account to evaluate the total employment
e¤ect of the wage subsidy. The more elastic the supply curve, the greater
the employment response. Generally supply elasticities are relatively high
for low-wage workers (Katz, 1998), a result also expected for South Africa
where unemployment among low-skilled workers is very high. This suggests
that an employment subsidy scheme in South Africa could have a relatively
large impact on employment.
2.2 Targeted employment subsidies
Often employment subsidies are targeted at speci…c labour categories or in-
dustries. Targeting tends to be associated with trade-o¤s. The basic tar-
geting principle is the following: the narrower the target group is de…ned,
the more e¤ective it will be in reaching the intended bene…ciaries. Narrow
targeting also lowers the actual cost of the subsidy, as fewer bene…ciaries are
4An alternative scenario is one where workers receive the subsidy (as opposed to …rms).
In this case the supply of labour curve will shift to the right. A higher wage implies that
the relative cost of leisure increases, thus encouraging individual workers to increase their
supply of labour. This allows the aggregate labour supply curve to shift to the right. If
markets function perfectly these two e¤ects are similar.Wage subsidy scheme for South Africa 6
involved. However, narrow targeting is also associated with higher adminis-
tration cost and administrative complexities. Broad targeting is much easier
to administer, but the actual subsidy cost becomes much higher. The choice
of targeting strategy requires a balance between administrative capacity, the
breadth of the unemployment problem and the …nancial constraints.
In the light of declining employment and a shift in labour demand to-
wards more skilled labour classes, there is a strong case for targeting a wage
subsidy at semi- and unskilled workers. An employment subsidy will as-
sist them in …nding employment, gaining experience and increasing their
employability. Once employed, the subsequent probability of entering unem-
ployment decreases signi…cantly, as demonstrated by Kingdon and Knight
(2000). Targeted wage subsidies could, however, have the negative side ef-
fect of stigmatising targeted workers (Burtless as cited in Heintz and Bowles,
1996). Since …rms do not have perfect information about workers applying
for jobs they might think that targeted groups of workers are less produc-
tive than non-targeted groups, which is why they don’t …nd employment and
need government assistance to …nd work.
Because semi- and unskilled workers make up about 40% of the South
African labour market, the cost of a ‘general’ subsidy targeting all these
workers will be high. It is possible to reduce the cost by changing it to
a ’marginal’ subsidy, i.e. one that is only applicable to additional workers
employed rather than all workers. One problem with a marginal subsidy
is that it may encourage a high turnover of labour in order for …rms to
continually qualify for a subsidy. Therefore, wage subsidies should ideally be
based on net changes in employment to prevent …rms taking advantage of
the system. Such a scheme could be particularly complex and costly from an
administrative point of view (Heintz and Bowles, 1996).
An alternative/complementary approach to reducing costs is the target-
ing of industries. There are various factors that the policymaker can take
into account when selecting industries for targeting. These range from the
industry size, labour intensity, wage elasticity of demand and backward- and
forward linkages (see Pauw (2002) for further details).
2.3 Payment options
A wage subsidy can be calculated as a lump sum per worker or as a …xed
percentage of the wage. The subsidy can be disbursed in the form of a direct
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are used, as these are easier to administer. The calculation and disbursement
of the subsidy are not contentious issues in the literature. More contentious
is the debate on whether to pay the subsidy to the employer or the employee
(see footnote 5).This is also at present an important issue in the development
of South African policy.5
In theory there is no di¤erence between a subsidy payable to the …rm or
the employee. In order to make comparisons between the two approaches,
one has to assume that the supply curve for labour is upward sloping. If
the subsidy is payable to the employer, the ’derived’ labour demand curve
will shift to the right (see right-hand panel of Figure 1).The bene…t of the
subsidy is shared between the …rm and the employee. Alternatively, if the
subsidy is paid to workers, the aggregate labour supply curve will shift to
the right, resulting in a new equilibrium where, as before, the bene…t of the
subsidy is shared between the employer and the employee. In both instances
the worker earns more, the employer pays a lower wage, and employment is
increased by the same margin.
However, the employment impact of a wage subsidy di¤ers ifthe payment
procedure (toworkers or the …rm) enables either the …rmorthe existing work-
ers to extract the subsidy as a rent. For example, …rms receive immediate
windfall gains without increasing employment if they receive a subsidy for
all workers employed (Heintz and Bowles, 1996). This may induce them to
maintain their existing labour force size, thus rendering the subsidy scheme
ine¤ective. This can only be monitored by implementing some form of con-
trol which forces …rms to increase their workforce by some minimum level
before being eligible for a subsidy. Unions can also counteract the employ-
ment generating impact by negotiating higher wages if the subsidy is paid
to the …rm, or prohibiting wage reductions if the wage is paid to the worker.
In the extreme case the entire subsidy is extracted as a rent and …rms pay
the same wage as before with no direct impact on employment. The cost of
the subsidy in this case is a deadweight loss, as the objective of increased
employment is not realised. There might be indirect employment e¤ects as
higher household income will boost consumptiondemand, but these are likely
to be small.
While the optimal method of payment is an important consideration that
requires further analysis, this paper makes the simplifying assumption of
5In the development of ideas and arguments contained in the section below, the author
has bene…ted from discussions with o¢cials in the National Treasury.Wage subsidy scheme for South Africa 8
well functioning markets. In this case the employment e¤ect is exactly the
same whether the subsidy is payable to the worker (as in this paper) or the
employer. The results of the wage simulations are possibly optimistic as they
do not take into account market power within product and labour markets.6
2.4 Financing an employment subsidy
Phelps (1994: 58) argues that wage subsidies would require a large bud-
getary outlay, but that savings in welfare entitlements, unemployment ben-
e…ts, crime …ghting, and increased tax revenue “might counterbalance the
[impact on the] budget”. An e¤ective employment subsidy scheme would
allow government to save on welfare outlays and generate more income- and
consumption tax due to the reduction in unemployment. Whether these sav-
ings would exceed the actual subsidy cost is uncertain. The …scal cost of an
employment subsidy scheme…nanced purely by government can be quite sub-
stantial if employment subsidies are broadly targeted. However, the trade-o¤
between narrow and broad targeting with regard to actual subsidisation cost
and administrative cost was highlighted before. Therefore the policy choice
should depend on the circumstances.
One suggested approach to funding employment subsidies is through a
tax on capital (see Heintz and Bowles, 1996). The rationale behind a capital
asset tax is that, in addition to the factor price ratio distortion caused by
the wage subsidy, it further increases the relative price of capital. This will
complement the substitution process of labour for capital initiated by the
employment subsidy. If the government is reluctant to tax all capital goods
it is possible to tax only certain goods, for example those capital goods
that produce environmentally harmful emissions. This will limit the use of
speci…c capital goods. Although a tax on capital assets reduces the burden
on the budget and further contributes to the factor-price distortion of an
employment subsidy, it could prove to be di¢cult to determine the value of
the capital assets to be taxed. A capital tax may also be harmful to some
of the high-growth capital-intensive sectors in South Africa, which could
ultimately have a negative impact on the economy.
An alternative revenue-neutral …nancing option is an increase in income
and pro…t tax rates. Higher household income tax rates will a¤ect household
6See Pauw (2002) for simulations in which the entire subsidy is extracted as a rent by
union power.Wage subsidy scheme for South Africa 9
consumptionspending, especially for households inhigh-income tax brackets.
On the other hand, the bene…ciaries of the employment subsidy scheme (e.g.
semi- and unskilled workers) will increase consumption spending. If the net
e¤ect is a decrease in overall consumption, it could counteract the employ-
ment generating e¤ect of the wage subsidy. Increased enterprise taxes will
also counteract the impact of the wage subsidy on employment, while …rms’
investment levels may also be a¤ected due to lower after-tax pro…ts. A …nal
…nancing option is de…cit …nancing. Rather than raising capital or income
tax rates, government can opt to …nance the subsidy by borrowing funds on
the capital market. This, however, may crowd out private investment.
The manner in which the wage subsidy scheme is …nanced has di¤erent
repercussions for the domestic economy. Inassessing the optimal approach to
implementing a wage subsidy scheme it is important to compare the impact
arising from these various …nancing options. In this study we assess the net
economy-wide impact of revenue-neutral (income and pro…t tax increase) and
de…cit …nancing methods.
2.5 Concluding remarks
The implementation of a wage subsidy scheme has a number of economy-
wide e¤ects. Wage subsidies may reduce product prices by lowering the cost
of production. This raises the real income of households and thus boosts
consumption and savings. Lower prices also improve export competitiveness
and this can have important e¤ects on the domestic currency. Increased em-
ployment arising from the wage subsidy raises household income and further
boosts consumption and savings. De…cit …nancing reduces government sav-
ings and crowds out investment. In modelling the impact of a wage subsidy
scheme it is important to capture some of these inter-sectoral and macroeco-
nomic e¤ects.
In this paper we use a Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) model,
which captures the interactions between markets and economic agents, to
model various scenarios regarding the targeting and …nancing of a wage sub-
sidy scheme. In the following section we discusses the methodology and data
usedin modelling thepossible impact of an employment subsidy on the South
African economy.Wage subsidy scheme for South Africa 10
3 Empirical Methodology
3.1 Computable general equilibrium models7
General equilibrium analysis is concerned with …nding a set of prices that
clears all markets simultaneously. Households, producers, factors of pro-
duction, the government sector, and the foreign sector are interdependent
and economic agents act on market signals to solve for the economy-wide
equilibrium. As a result, general equilibrium analysis can become very com-
plicated, as choices of consumers and …rms need to be co-ordinated across
markets on an economy-wide basis (Estrin and Laidler, 1995). The aim of
CGE models is to capture the interdependence between economic agents at
a microeconomic level in a structural mathematical model that also takes
various macroeconomic constraints into account.
In this paper we draw upon a generic model that was initially developed
by the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) (see Löfgren
et al., 2001) and adapted for South Africa by Lewis (2001). The format of
this standard CGE model has been used extensively in developing countries,
although adjustments need to be made to ensure adequate representation of
the economy being studied. Once the model is calibrated to the relevant
Social Accounting Matrix of the economy, policy shocks can be simulated. A
new general equilibrium is calculated, and variables are compared with the
base data in a comparative static fashion. The adjustment process and the
long-run dynamic e¤ects are not captured in the model used in this analysis.
The standard CGE model works by simulating the interaction of various
economic actors across markets (Robinson, 1989). Activities (or producers)
maximise pro…ts subject to a production technology. Households maximise
utility subject to their budget constraints. Other agents include government
and the rest of the world. The factor market is comprised of capital and
labour at various degrees of disaggregation. In each case the behavioural
rules of the optimising economic agents are speci…ed in the form of equations.
In addition, equilibrium conditions or system constraints are imposed.
These ensure, for example, that labour demand equals supply, commodity
demand equals supply, savings equals investment, the BOP constraint holds
and government income equals expenditure plus government savings. These
system constraints de…ne the equilibrium in the relevant markets. In the
7A more detailed discussion of the model is provided in Löfgren et al., (2001) and Pauw
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neoclassical model the equilibrating variables are product and factor prices
which feed back into supply and demand decisions by producers and house-
holds. In a more structuralist model, market rigidities arising from policy or
institutional structures may inhibit the response of prices to market forces.
To an extent these features can also be captured in the standard CGE model
(see later).
The model in this analysis makes use of a “variety of substitution mecha-
nisms”to modelproducers’ andconsumers’economicdecision-making processes
(Arndt and Lewis, 2000: 5). Production and consumption functions are gen-
erally modelled as constant elasticity of substitution (CES) function, which
nest the Leontief, Cobb-Douglas and perfect substitution functions (see Löf-
gren et al, 2001).8 The substitution elasticities are not solved endogenously,
but are imposed from outside the model. This introduces much of the con-
troversy surrounding CGE analysis, as the results are highly sensitive to the
parameters selected (Dawkins et al., 2001; McDaniel and Balistreri, 2001).
The model utilised in this analysis maintains the parameters used in Lewis
(2001).9








In the function above y denotes the output, ®1, ®2 and ½ are parameters and x1 and
x2 are the two factors of production. The elasticity of substitution is calculated as ¾ =
1=(1 ¡ ½) . The CES function is versatile in that it nests various functions with di¤ering
degrees of substitutability between factors, e.g. the Leontief production function (¾ = 0),
the Cobb-Douglas production function (¾ = 1) and the perfect substitution production
function (¾ = 1).
9The elasticity of substitution values for the CES functions range between 0.75 to
4. The elasticity of transformation for the constant elasticity of transformation function
that allocates production between export and domestic goods equals 2. The Armington
elasticities, which determine the substitution between domestic and imported goods and
have drawn the most criticism (McDaniel and Balistreri, 2001), equal 2. This elasticity is
relatively unimportant in this study, as the prices of imported relative to domestic goods
do not change substantially. The results of the analysis appear robust to changes in the
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3.2 Model closures, structural features and parameter
estimates
The model used in this analysis is “Walrasian and neoclassical in its truest
form”, but it is possible to incorporate certain “structural rigidities” (Robin-
son, 1989: 894). Often in developing countries the assumptions of perfect
competition and perfectly functioning markets have to make way for more
realistic non-neoclassical behavioural assumptions, such as macro imbalances
and institutional rigidities. In this section we outline speci…c structural fea-
tures and parameter values imposed on the model to ensure as close a rep-
resentation of the South African economy as possible.10
The …rst process in constructing a representative CGE model is to cal-
ibrate it to domestic data. Because basic data drawn from various sources
do not generally satisfy the general equilibrium conditions of the model, it
is necessary to choose values for particular parameters such that the model
replicates aconsistent equilibriumdata set, thebenchmark dataset (Dawkins
et al., 2001). This process is known as calibration. In this case the model
is calibrated using a South African SAM for 1997.11 The SAM consists
of 21 production sectors, 14 household categories, and 4 classes of labour,
namely professional (14%), skilled (30%), semi- and unskilled (40%) and in-
formal labour (16%). This enables areasonableassessment of theproduction,
household and employment impacts arising from a wage subsidy.
It is also important to select closures to ensure that the macroeconomic
constraints hold: BalanceofPayments, savings-investment, government income-
expenditure and factor supply-demand. The behaviour of CGE models de-
pends crucially upon the model’s description of the causal linkages in the
macroeconomic system. To ensure adequate representation of the relevant
economy “the model’s ‘closure’ has to be chosen and justi…ed on the basis of
empirical and institutional analysis of the economy at hand” (Taylor, 1990:
7). This is important as “preliminary experiments suggest that the choice of
the macroclosure ‘matters’ ” (Decaluwe et al., 1988: 71. See also Adelman
and Robinson, 1988).
Behind the choice of closures lie a number of di¤erent theoretical para-
digms. The standard CGE model, although neoclassical in origin, is versatile
10Macroeconomic closures and certain parameter values need to be imposed as the sys-
tem is overidenti…ed.
11This SAM was developed by WEFA, a global economics consulting …rm, and is based
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enough to incorporate limited structural features of an economy. However,
the model still retains essential neoclassical features: economic agents sub-
stitute in response to relative price shocks, decisions are based on real values
and prices in general adjust to clear markets. The adjustment processes
within the model will, thus, di¤er substantially from structuralist models,
such as that of Gibson (2000), for South Africa. Further, the policy conclu-
sions arising from neoclassical and structuralist models will necessarily di¤er
(Gibson and Van Seventer, 2000).
The model includes three macroeconomic balances, namely the govern-
ment balance, the external balance and the savings-investment balance. The
following closures were selected for each of these:
Government budget: The government balance ensures that the bud-
get de…cit (negative savings) or surplus remains equal to the di¤erence be-
tween government revenue and expenditure. We model two closures. In the
…rst closure, government savings are ‡exible. An increase in the government
expenditure (ceteris paribus) is …nanced by an increase in government bor-
rowing which raises the de…cit. Alternatively, a ‘balanced budget’ closure is
modelled. Under this closure taxes on households and enterprises are allowed
to vary in order to maintain the budget de…cit of the base model. In all simu-
lations we assume government expenditure on goods and services (excluding
the cost of the subsidy) are …xed. Government revenue varies as tax receipts
change due to changes in income or consumption and in the balanced budget
case due to changes in average tax rates.
External balance: The external balance (balance of payments) ensures
that the domestic value of foreign currency receipts match local currency
out‡ows. Capital ‡ows as well as trade ‡ows are included. We model a
‡exibleexchange rateregime with foreign savings assumed…xed. This re‡ects
the‡exibleexchange rate regime of the SouthAfrican Reserve Bank (SARB).
As the trade balance changes, the exchange rate adjusts to maintain the
Balance of Payments.12
Savings-investment balance: In the model savings equal investment.
An investment function is not modelled explicitly and current period invest-
ment does not feed into changes in the capital stock, i.e. the medium-term
dynamics are not captured. The savings-investment closure can be modelled
in two ways. In an investment-driven model institutions (households and
12In an alternative closure the exchange rate can be …xed and the Balance of Payments
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…rms) change their marginal propensity to save (MPS) in order to meet tar-
geted investment levels. The level of investment is therefore exogenous. The
equilibrating process di¤ers slightly from a Keynesian style model as the re-
quired savings are realised through changes in the propensity to save rather
than increases in national income. If unemployment is modelled some of the
required savings will be generated via increased employment and national
income. Alternatively, a neoclassical savings-driven closure can be modelled.
In this case investment is endogenous and responds to changes in aggregate
savings. Aggregate savings is the sum of institutions’ savings, government
(dis-)saving, foreign savings and enterprise savings. In the simulations pre-
sented in this study, the neoclassical savings-driven closure was selected.
The standard neoclassical model assumes full employment in all factor
markets. However, this assumption is not valid for semi- and unskilled work-
ers in South Africa. To model semi- and unskilled unemployment we assume
a …xed real wage and an unlimited supply of labour at this wage (i.e. the
left-hand diagram of Figure 1). This assumes that the wage elasticity of sup-
ply is in…nite. We assume all other sub-classes of labour (professional, skilled
and informal workers) are mobile and fully employed at ‡exible wages.
In the neoclassical model, capital is assumed to be fully employed and
mobileacross sectors. Inthe long run thisassumptionmay be valid. However,
in the short term rigidities prohibit both the re-allocation of capital across
sectors and substantial changes in the capital stock. In this paper we take
the short-run approach and assume …rms (and by extension industries) are
unable toadjust the level ofcapital stock employedintheproductionprocess.
Capital is thus activity speci…c.
A further structural feature was introduced in the mining sector. Most
analyses on South Africa using CGE models (Arndt and Lewis, 2000; Lewis,
2001; Thurlow, 2002) assume that South African producers and consumers
areprice-takers inthe international market. This assumption is valid for most
South African commodities, but is questionable for certain mining products
(especially diamonds, coal, gold and uranium ore) given South Africa’s dom-
inance in world trade of these products. Thus, in contrast to the standard
treatment of exporting industries, mining sector exports are modelled as a
function of the relative price of world exports and foreign substitute goods.13
13Export demand is de…ned as a function of the relative price of South African exports
to foreign exports. Following McDonald (2002) the elasticity of demand for exports in the
mining sector is assumed to equal 2.Wage subsidy scheme for South Africa 15
Initial simulations have shown that a failure to model mining in this fashion
results in overwhelmingly large increases in exports (over 25 %) and employ-
ment (over 40 %) in the mining sector.14
4 Simulation set-up and results
A general wage subsidy reduces the wage paid by the …rm, while maintain-
ing the wage earned by the employee. This is modelled by lowering the wage
rate in the …rm’s pro…t maximising equation (w¤ = MRP), while maintain-
ing the wage level in the factor income equation (wage times quantity of
labour employed). As discussed, …rms respond to lower wages by increasing
employment to the point where the subsidised wage is equal to the marginal
revenue product (MRP). This causes in an outward shift in the aggregate
demand for labour curve (as shown in Figure 1).
We use the standard CGE model adjusted to South Africa to perform
three wage subsidy simulations. In all the simulations government subsidises
10% of the wage of semi- and unskilled workers. The transfer from gov-
ernment to …rms is therefore 10% of the total income (wage bill) of semi-
and unskilled workers. The “cost of the subsidy” varies depending on the
employment impact of each scenario. Previously employed individuals gain
nothing from the subsidy as they still earnthe samewage as before. However,
newly employed (formerly unemployed) individualsgain in the form of awage
income. In the analysis that follows we discuss the following simulations:
1. In the …rst simulation the subsidy is granted to all industries and …-
nanced via a budget de…cit, i.e. the state borrows funds to pay for the
subsidy.
2. In the second simulation the subsidy is granted to all industries, but
is …nanced via an endogenous increase in direct taxes on institutions.
Households thus pay a higher average income tax and …rms pay higher
pro…t taxes. This is the so-called balanced budget closure.
14The signi…cant increase in mining exports is driven by unrealistic reductions in the
domestic price of gold products which given …xed world prices raises the export price
relative to the domestic price. The signi…cant reduction in the domestic price is largely
driven by low (almost zero) domestic consumption of gold products that would otherwise
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3. The third simulation assumes a balanced-budget closure, but industry
targeting takes place. Four industries were targeted: (1) agriculture,
forestry & …shing, (2) textiles & apparel, (3) leather goods & footwear,
and (4) wood & furniture.
The results of the various simulations are summarised in Table 2, Table
3 and Table 4.
4.1 Simulation 1: 10% wage subsidy with de…cit …-
nancing
This simulation models a scenario where government subsidises 10% of the
wage of all semi- and unskilled workers inall industries. Government …nances
the scheme by increasing the budget de…cit. As expected the e¤ect of the
wage subsidy is an increase in semi- and unskilled employment in all sectors
(Table 3 and Figure 2). The increase in employment of semi- and unskilled
labour ranges from a low of 2.8% in the construction industry to a high
of 11.1% in the medical and health services sector, with an economy-wide
average increase of 8.7%. Full employment of all other classes of labour
(and capital) is imposed by assumption. However, an increase in demand
for labour in response to improved output growth raises the wage rates of
professional workers (0.74%), skilled workers (1.07%) and informal workers
(0.80%).
Output increases in most industries with the exception of the construc-
tion industry. The economy-wide increase in production is equal to 1.1%.
This increase in production is mainly driven by a 2.3% growth in domes-
tic consumption demand (Table 2).Due to lower production costs associated
with the lower wage paid by the …rm, domestic prices for most products
decline.15 This a¤ects the export-domestic price ratio, causing …rms to shift
production towards the export market. Particularly high growth in exports
is experienced in labour-intensive industries where the wage subsidy has a
relatively large impact on domestic prices. At the same time consumers de-
mand more domestic produced goods in response to a rise in the relative
price of imports. The joint e¤ect of increased exports and lower imports
15A weighted index of domestic prices is selected as the numéraire. Thus, not all com-
modity prices can decline. Relatively large domestic price declines are experienced in
sectors with large shares of semi- and unskilled labour while price increases are experi-
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leads to a positive e¤ect on the balance of payments. Since foreign savings
are …xed, the exchange rate appreciates by 1.2% to correct the imbalance
on the foreign account. Overall, rising import prices as well as the domestic
price of services lead to a (negligible) 0.2% increase in the CPI (Table 2).
The signi…cant employment e¤ect of the wage subsidy has an important
impact on household income levels. Since relatively poor households (often
de…ned as the …rst four income deciles) derive most of their income from
semi- and unskilled wages, these households bene…t the most from the sub-
sidy. Although wages of semi- and unskilled workers remain constant, more
individuals are employed in every representative household group (or decile),
thus increasing the income of the group as a whole. High-income house-
holds also experience an increase in their incomes, mainly via the increase in
wages of other labour classes from which they derive most of their income.
Relatively speaking the increase in the income of high-income households is
slightly less than for low-income households (Table 4 and Figure 3).The wage
subsidy is therefore e¤ective in reducing inequality by favouring poor house-
holds more than it favours the rich. The growth in consumption demand is
mainly spurred by the increase in household income, with low-income house-
holds able to increase consumption slightly more (in relative terms) than
high-income households.
The government budget closure selected has various important indirect
e¤ects. In order to …nance the subsidy, government has to increase its bor-
rowings by R6.1 billion or 28.0% (Table 2). This translates into an increase
in the de…cit from 3.0% to 3.8% of GDP. Roughly 68% of the subsidy cost
is …nanced via this de…cit increase. The remainder of the R9.1 billion cost
of the subsidy (1997 prices) is …nanced via increased tax receipts. Although
the various direct and indirect tax rates remain unchangedin this simulation,
the higher household income and consumption demand allows government to
increase its revenue from direct taxes, consumption taxes and excise taxes.
Overall government revenue increases by 1.7%.
The large increase in the budget de…cit has an important impact on na-
tional savings. Despite small increases in enterprise and household savings,
national savings decrease by 3.8% (Table 2). By assumption investors can
onlydrawor borrowfunds for investmentfrom the pool ofsavings. Due tothe
savings-investment closure selected, the level of investment is determined by
the change in the level of savings, i.e. investment is ‘savings-driven’. There-
fore, when the pool of savings in the economy decreases by 3.8%, investmentWage subsidy scheme for South Africa 18
also decreases by the same percentage.16
Investment is modelled as expenditure on goods and services in the econ-
omy. Thus, a decline in investment negatively a¤ects the demand for goods
and services. Typically industries that supply investment-type goods, such
as the construction industry and the machinery and equipment industry, are
hardest hit by sharp decreases in investment demand. The drop in demand
has an adverse e¤ect on employment (the so-called indirect employment ef-
fect of the wage subsidy) in all industries, but especially those that specialise
in investment goods (construction industry). However, the dominating ef-
fect remains the direct employment e¤ect of the wage subsidy, as well as a
positive indirect employment e¤ect associated with the increase in private
consumption.
Since the model is comparative static, the decline in investment does not
a¤ect the growth potential of the economy in the short run. GDP growth
is measured at 0.8%. It is generally recognised that poor investment growth
will have a detrimental e¤ect on the growth of capital stock and GDP growth
in the long run. These important a¤ects are not captured in this model.
4.2 Simulation 2: 10% wage subsidy with balanced
budget
In the second simulation government raises taxes on enterprises and house-
holds in order to …nance the increased government expenditure on the wage
subsidy scheme.
As in the previous simulation, employment of semi- and unskilled labour
responds positively to the wage subsidy, rising by 9.0 % on average (Fig-
ure 2 and Table 3).Important sectoral di¤erences from the de…cit-…nanced
simulation emerge, with relatively high employment growth experienced in
industries that typically supply investment goods (construction, machinery
& equipment). The services sectors and those supplying ‘normal’ consump-
tion goods have a slightly lower employment e¤ect (Figure 2).The di¤erences
between the de…cit-…nanced and balancedbudget simulations re‡ect the com-
position e¤ects arising from higher domestic investment combined with lower
disposable income in the latter simulation. As before, an increase in demand
16Note that …xed investment declines by 4.0%, while the ‘change of inventories’ entry
in the GDP table is 1.4%. The …gure of -3.8% is a weighted average of these two numbers
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for the other fully employed classes of labour leads to a rise in their nominal
wages.
Output increases by 1.3%, which is also slightly higher than before. As in
the previous simulation, …rms shift production towards the export market,
while consumers substitute domestic goods for imported goods. Exports
and imports increase by approximately 0.8% with the higher import impact
partly re‡ectingimprovedinvestment that is relatively import intensive. The
currency appreciates (0.8%) but slightly less than before.
The increase in household income levels is also very similar to the pre-
vious simulation (Table 4).All households experience an increase in income,
with lower-income households bene…ting more from the subsidy. However,
clear di¤erences between the simulations emerge when comparing consump-
tion levels (Figure 3).Consumption in low-income households rises by similar
amounts inboth simulations. Incontrast, consumption of middle-income and
high-income households is signi…cantly lower in the balanced budget simu-
lation. This di¤erence re‡ects the impact of increased taxes on disposable
income within these households.
The total cost of the subsidy is R9.2 billion (Table 2), which is marginally
higher than the …rst simulation. In order to …nance the subsidy the direct
tax rates on institutions need to be raised by 5.4%. As a result of this tax
rate increase, as well as the 2.1% overall increase in real household income
(Table 4), direct tax receipts increase by 7.4%. Increases in excise, import
and consumption taxes also contribute to the higher government revenue.
Government revenue receipts from all sources together increase by 5.1%. If
indirect taxes had not increased, (endogenous) direct taxes would have had
to increase more to balance the budget.
With an assumed …xed savings rate and higher income, household and
enterprise savings are slightly higher, contributing to the 0.6% increase in
national savings. This allows investment to increase by the same percentage
via the savings-driven investment closure. Fixed investment increases by
0.6%, while the change in inventories is 1.6%. The impact of higher taxes is
clear when comparing the growth in consumption demand, which now ‘only’
increases by 1.3%, compared to the 2.3% increase before. However, the shift
towards investment made possible by increased savings contributes towards
GDP, which increases by 0.9% in this simulation.Wage subsidy scheme for South Africa 20
4.3 Simulation 3: Targeted 10% wage subsidy with
balanced budget
Four industries were targeted in this simulation. The agriculture, forestry
& …shing industry is the largest employer of unskilled workers. It also has
a fairly low capital-labour ratio and a high labour-output coe¢cient for un-
skilled workers. The other targeted industries, namely textiles & apparel,
leather goods & footwear, and wood & furniture may not be very large in
terms of their employment or value-added structures, but they have low
capital-labour ratios and highlabour-output coe¢cients. These factors make
theseindustries suitable for targeting.17 The targeted industries together em-
ploy roughly one third of all semi- and unskilled workers in the economy.
Total semi- and unskilled employment increases by 2.4% (Table 2). Com-
pared to the previous simulations, the increase in semi- and unskilled em-
ployment is smaller in all the targeted industries. This is due to the indirect
employment e¤ects that were lost because fewer industries were included
in the wage subsidy scheme. By excluding certain industries inter-industry
employment multipliers are reduced. Further, lower increases in household
income reduce the consumption expenditure impact on output. However, it
is equally interesting to see that most of the other non-targeted industries
still report increasedemployment levels, despite not receivinga subsidy. This
is due to the multiplier e¤ect in the economy as well as the indirect employ-
ment e¤ect of increased investment and consumption. As expected, output
growth is lower for all industries when the subsidy is targeted at a few select
industries.
Households are a¤ected in asimilar way as before, althoughthe impact on
income and consumption is much smaller (Figure 3). Low-income households
are again favoured by the subsidy and high-income households experience
almost no increase in consumption. As a result of the higher income levels,
households and enterprises save more and overall national savings increase
by 0.1%. This allows investment to increase by the same percentage. Private
consumption increases by 0.2% and exports and imports increase by 0.1%
and 0.2% respectively. The growth in GDP is 0.2%.
Government revenue increases by 0.7%, with direct tax rates adjusted
upwards by 0.7% to fund the subsidy cost of R1.3 billion (1997 prices). Just
17Note that the selection of industries here was not necessarily done in any systematic
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more than 87 000 jobs are created. Under the non-targeted scenario the cost
was R9.2 billion, while just over 324 000 jobs were created. Some interesting
comparisons are shown in Table 1. In the non-targeted simulation with a
balanced budget, the per capita subsidy cost was R2 328. This drops signi…-
cantly to R927 when selected industries are targeted. The lower subsidy per
worker re‡ects lower wages for semi- and unskilled workers in the targeted
industries than in the remaining industries.18 An alternative measure of the
e¢ciency of the subsidy is the cost per job created, which is almost half the
cost of the non-targeted scenario (R14 826 vs R28 259) (see Table 1). The
results suggest that, despite the smaller economy-wide impact, the targeted
subsidy is the most e¢cient strategy.
5 Conclusions
Unemployment has reached extremely high levels during the last decade,
especially among semi- and unskilled workers. Some of this unemployment
is structural in origin. Capital biased strategic intervention in the economy
and poor education policies combined with skill-biased-technological change
have negatively a¤ected employment of less-skilled labour. However, rising
real wages of semi- and unskilled workers have also arguably contributed to
rising unemployment levels.
In this paper we evaluate the impact on employment of a wage subsidy
scheme currently being considered by the South African government. Em-
ployment subsidies aim to increase employment levels directly by subsidising
the wage paid by the employer. This counteracts the e¤ect that increased
labour costs have on employment levels and encourages …rms to hire more
workers. Apart from the direct employment e¤ect of employment subsidies,
various indirect e¤ects also exist. Changes in the cost of production arising
from the employment subsidy scheme a¤ect export and import performance.
Wage income generated through increased employment can have a demand
stimulus e¤ect on the economy. This, however, depends on the manner in
whichthe employment subsidy schemeis …nanced. If…nanced throughde…cit
spending, domestic savings will decline which negatively a¤ects investment.
If …nanced through increased taxation, disposable income of wealthy house-
18Wages of all semi- and unskilled workers are …xed by assumption, but provision is
made in the standard CGE model for industry speci…c wages via the use of a so-called
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holds may decline. These economy-wide impacts suggest the use of general
equilibrium models to simulate the economic impact of various wage subsidy
schemes.
CGE models should, however, be used with caution, as model assump-
tions regarding various market closures and elasticities can have signi…cant
e¤ects on the results. Inthis paper we use a CGE model with strong neoclas-
sical foundations to evaluate the impact of various wage simulation scenarios.
In constructing the model we impose various restrictions in order to ade-
quately represent certain structural features of the South African economy.
In particular, we model the presence of unemployment amongst semi- and
unskilled labour. We also model a ‡exible exchange rate regime and impose
a saving driven investment closure. Finally, we model an export demand
function for the mining sector (largely gold and platinum) to re‡ect South
Africa’s international importance in this sector.
Three scenarios were simulated: a de…cit …nanced wage subsidy scheme,
a balanced budget wage subsidy scheme and atargeted wage subsidy scheme.
In all simulations semi- and unskilled wages were subsidised by 10%. The
results of the various simulations provided some interesting comparisons.
The de…cit …nanced and balanced budget wage subsidy simulations had
similar outcomes on employment levels. In each case total employment of
semi- and unskilled labour rose by approximately 9% (324 000 jobs). This
implies a general equilibrium wage elasticity of approximately -0.9, which is
slightly higher than the econometric based partial estimates for South Africa
that range between -0.5 and -0.7.
The di¤erent approaches to …nancing the wage subsidy have important
composition e¤ects. The de…cit …nanced option increases the budget de…cit,
which in turn reduces national savings. This impacts negatively on private
…xed investment. In the balanced budget option direct household and en-
terprise taxes are raised endogenously to cover the subsidy cost. Investment
does not decline, but household consumption, particularly in high-income
households, declines relative to the de…cit-…nanced simulation. Important
sectoral di¤erences arise as a result. Output and employment growth in
investment-intensive sectors such as construction and machinery & equip-
ment is higher in the balanced budget simulation than the de…cit …nanced
simulation.
The targeting of labour-intensive industriesreduces thecost ofthesubsidy
signi…cantly, butat the expenseof employment gains. A 10%wagesubsidy in
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and wood & furniture raises employment of semi- and unskilled labour by
2.4 % or 87 000 jobs. However, we show that it is more e¢cient to target
industries that are responsive to real wage changes and have lower average
wages, as this reduces the per capita cost of the subsidy as well as the cost
per job created. As progressively more industries are added to the target
group, industries with higher average wages and lower wage elasticities of
demand are included, thus reducing the e¤ectiveness of the wage subsidy.
The targeted wage subsidy thus yields the more e¢cient outcome.
The results suggest that a wage subsidy scheme can have a substantial
positive impact on employment in South Africa. It is thus one possible ap-
proachthatcanbeusedto helpalleviate theunemployment probleminSouth
Africa. However, some caveats remain. The employment subsidy targets
wage induced unemployment and not structural unemployment. Structural
unemployment arising from skill-biased-technological change requires invest-
ment in human capital accumulation. If initiated, the wage subsidy scheme
ought to be seen as a temporary measure to alleviate unemployment in the
shortrunwhilealternative long-runpolicies (suchas investmentineducation)
facilitate labour market adjustments to correct for structural unemployment.
The e¤ectiveness of a wage subsidy scheme also needs to be considered
relative to alternative policies. For example, will a policy of increased in-
vestment in social infrastructure combined with a basic income grant yield
a superior result? Rather than attempting to in‡uence employment through
distorting relative factor payments, it may be better for the government to
directly target social infrastructure such as education, roads, harbours, etc.
The negative welfare impacts arising from unemployment may be alleviated
through direct grants. These alternatives need to be assessed in conjunction
with a wage subsidy scheme. This is particularly important as the wage sub-
sidy scheme, particularly a targeted scheme, may be characterised by high
administration costs. Administration costs are not modelled in the current
simulations and as result the subsidy cost per employment gained is likely to
be underestimated.
Alternative measures that shift out the demand curve for less skilled
labour also need to be considered. The wage subsidy leads to a shift down
the …rm’s labour demand curve. An alternative approach is to shift out the
labour demand curve, i.e. increase labour demand at all wage levels (Nat-
trass, 2000). Export markets are potentially an important source of demand
for South African products, and thus labour demand (Fields, 2000). Factors
that restrict export growth need to be explored. Edwards and Golub (2002),Wage subsidy scheme for South Africa 24
for example, …nd that rising unit labour costs have a large negative impact
on export growth. Improved productivity combined with wage moderation
will improve labour demand through export growth.
Finally, the current simulations assume that economic agents within the
labour or product market do not capture the wage subsidy as a rent. Inalter-
native simulations Pauw (2002) …nds that the employment impact declines
to zero when the subsidy is fully captured as a rent. The model assumptions
also in‡uence the outcomes. As noted the model is neoclassical in origin.
Structuralist models such as that of Gibson (2000) may give alternative re-
sults. The impact of wage subsidies using these alternative models also needs
to be explored.
In conclusion, it is clear that under conditions of well-functioning labour
markets a wage subsidy scheme could have positive e¤ects on employment
and various other economic aggregates. Increased consumption, investment,
income, savings and employment could contribute towards higher output
and GDP. The method of …nancing as well as the scope of the subsidy can
potentially haveimportant indirect e¤ects andshouldbe considered carefully.
However, it is important torealisethatwagesubsidyschemesare only oneofa
possible array of policy options to reduce unemployment. Careful evaluation
ofthe alternatives is important prior to the implementation of a wage subsidy
scheme.
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& Company: New York.Table 1: Total subsidy cost and per capita subsidy cost 
Wage subsidy with balanced budget, no targeting (Simulation 2) 
Number of semi- and unskilled workers in base  3,612,068 
Total number of semi- and unskilled after subsidy  3,936,300 
Jobs created  324,232 
Total subsidy cost  R9.2 billion 
Per capita subsidy cost  R 2,328 
Cost per job created   R 28,259 
Wage subsidy with balanced budget, targeting (Simulation 3) 
Total number of semi- and unskilled after subsidy  3,699,251 
Jobs created  87,183 
No. of semi- and unskilled workers in base (targeted industries)  1,072,043 
Number of workers receiving subsidy (targeted industries)  1,393,900 
Jobs created in 5 industries  83,300 
Total subsidy cost  R1.3 billion 
Per capita subsidy cost  R 927 
Cost per job created   R 14,826 
Note: In the case of a 5% subsidy, the estimated cost of the full subsidy falls to about R4.4 billion, slightly less than 



























Table 2: Aggregate price data, savings-investments; government accounts, factor demand and GDP 
  Actual figures  Percentage changes 









Aggregate Price Data        
Exchange rate     (EXR)  1.00  0.99  0.99  1.00  -1.2%  -0.8%  -0.1% 
Consumer prices  (CPI)  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  0.2%  0.1%  0.0% 
Domestic prices   (DPI)  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  0.0%  0.0%  0.0% 
Savings-Investment Components        
Savings  115,818  111,460 116,557 115,972  -3.8%  0.6%  0.1% 
Household  savings  6,883  7,025 6,942 6,895 2.1%  0.9%  0.2% 
Enterprise  savings  120,547  122,330 121,305 120,703  1.5%  0.6%  0.1% 
Government  savings  -22,039  -28,202 -22,039 -22,039  28.0%  0.0%  0.0% 
Foreign  savings  10,427  10,307 10,348 10,413  -1.2%  -0.8%  -0.1% 
          
Investment  115,818  111,460 116,557 115,972  -3.8%  0.6%  0.1% 
Household  investment  8,461  8,125 8,512 8,473 -4.0% 0.6%  0.1% 
Enterprise  investment 89,714  86,150 90,250 89,845  -4.0%  0.6%  0.1% 
Government  investment  13,104  12,584 13,183 13,123  -4.0%  0.6%  0.1% 
Stock  changes  4,539  4,601 4,612 4,530 1.4%  1.6% -0.2% 
Investment adjustment 
factor 
1.00  0.96 1.01 1.00  -4.0%  0.6%  0.1% 
Government Accounts        
Total Budget Revenue  177,947  180,894  187,109  179,239  1.7%  5.1%  0.7% 
Direct  taxes  113,340  115,498 121,679 114,502  1.9%  7.4%  1.0% 
Excise  tax  9,103  9,120 9,166 9,094 0.2%  0.7% -0.1% 
Import  tax  5,619  5,589 5,657 5,623 -0.5% 0.7%  0.1% 
Consumption  tax  53,224  53,988 53,922 53,355  1.4%  1.3%  0.2% 
Transfer  (from  ROW)  -3,339  -3,300 -3,314 -3,335 -1.2%  -0.8%  -0.1% 
Tax adjustment factor  1.000  1.000  1.054  1.007  0.0%  5.4%  0.7% 
Total Budget 
Expenditure 
199,986  209,096 209,149 201,279  4.6%  4.6%  0.6% 
Government 
consumption 
177,054  177,054 177,054 177,054  0.0%  0.0%  0.0% 
Cost of subsidy  0  9,110  9,163  1,293       
Transfers  22,932  22,932 22,932 22,932  0.0%  0.0%  0.0% 
Budget  deficit  -22,039  -28,202 -22,039 -22,039  28.0%  0.0%  0.0% 
Budget deficit as % of 
GDP 
3.0%  3.8% 3.0% 3.0%  27.0%  -0.8%  -0.2% 
Factor Demand        
Capital stock  1,398,81
8 
1,398,818 1,398,818 1,398,818  0.0%  0.0%  0.0% 
Labour (thousands of 
workers) 
9,098  9,414 9,422 9,185 3.5%  3.6%  1.0% 
Labour  -  professional 1,237  1,237 1,237 1,237 0.0%  0.0%  0.0% 
Labour  -  skilled  2,763  2,763 2,763 2,763 0.0%  0.0%  0.0% 
Labour  -  unskilled  3,612  3,928 3,936 3,699 8.7%  9.0%  2.4% 
Labour  -  informal  1,486  1,486 1,486 1,486 0.0%  0.0%  0.0% 
Real GDP        
Private  consumption  431,072  441,046 436,654 432,069  2.3%  1.3%  0.2% 
Government 
consumption 
177,054  177,054 177,054 177,054  0.0%  0.0%  0.0% 
Fixed  investment  111,279  106,859 111,944 111,442  -4.0%  0.6%  0.1% 
Change in inventories  4,539  4,601  4,612  4,530  1.4%  1.6%  -0.2% 
Exports  168,415  168,265 169,679 168,657  -0.1%  0.8%  0.1% 
Imports  -160,716  -160,655 -162,039 -160,968  0.0%  0.8%  0.2% 








 Table 3: Sectoral output and factor use: percentage changes 
Sector  Wage subsidy (deficit financing)  Wage subsidy (balanced budget)  Targeted Subsidy 












Agriculture, forestry and 
fishing 
2.3%  10.0%  9.1% 2.1%  9.5%  8.6% 1.7%  7.7%  6.9% 
Mining and quarrying  2.7%  8.2%  6.2%  2.9%  8.7%  6.7%  -0.1%  -0.2%  -0.2% 
Food  processing  2.2% 9.9%  5.9%  1.9% 9.2%  5.2%  0.6% 1.5%  1.4% 
Textiles  and  apparel  4.6% 9.0%  7.0%  4.5% 8.8%  6.7%  4.1% 7.8%  5.9% 
Leather goods and footwear  4.7%  9.9%  8.5%  4.6%  9.4%  8.1%  4.2%  8.5%  7.2% 
Wood  and  furniture  2.8% 7.6%  4.7%  3.4% 8.8%  5.9%  3.0% 7.7%  5.0% 
Paper  and  printing  0.8% 8.3%  2.8%  0.9% 8.5%  2.9%  0.1% 0.4%  0.2% 
Petroleum products  1.1%  10.3%  5.0%  0.9% 9.7%  4.4%  0.0% 0.2%  0.1% 
Chemicals  1.0% 9.0%  3.7%  1.1% 9.3%  4.0%  0.1% 0.3%  0.2% 
Rubber, glass, plastic, non-
metal 
1.2% 6.3%  3.3%  1.8% 8.1%  5.0%  0.1% 0.3%  0.2% 
Basic  metals  1.2% 6.6%  3.1%  2.0% 8.2%  4.7%  -0.1%  -0.1%  -0.2% 
Machinery and equipment  0.6%  5.9%  2.0%  2.4%  8.9%  4.8%  -0.2%  -0.2%  -0.2% 
Electricity, gas and water  1.7%  10.9%  6.2% 1.6%  10.6%  5.8% 0.1%  0.3%  0.2% 
Construction  -1.0% 2.8%  -2.1%  1.8% 7.6%  2.3%  0.1% 0.2%  0.1% 
Trade  1.1%  10.0%  2.7% 1.1%  9.9%  2.6% 0.1%  0.4%  0.2% 
Tourism  1.2%  10.5%  2.6% 0.6%  9.3%  1.5% 0.1%  0.3%  0.2% 
Transport and storage  1.0%  8.8%  2.5%  1.1% 9.3%  2.4%  0.0% 0.1%  0.1% 
Financial and business 
services 
0.5% 10.6%  1.6%  0.3% 10.1%  1.0%  0.0%  0.3%  0.1% 
Medical and health services  0.9%  11.1%  2.4% 0.4%  9.9%  1.2% 0.1%  0.3%  0.2% 
Social and personal services  2.9%  10.1%  5.5% 1.9%  9.0%  4.4% 0.1%  0.2%  0.1% 
General government & other  0.4%  8.3%  0.7% 0.4%  8.3%  0.7% -0.1%  0.0%  -0.1% 
TOTAL/AGGREGATE  1.1% 8.7%  3.5%  1.3% 9.0%  3.6%  0.2% 2.4%  1.0% 
  
Table 4: Household consumption, cost of living and real income: percentage changes 
 Wage  subsidy  (deficit 
financing) 
Wage subsidy (balanced 
budget) 

























HH  0-10%  3.0% 0.0%  3.0%  3.2% -0.1%  3.2%  0.7% -0.2%  0.7% 
HH  10-20% 2.5% 0.0%  2.5%  2.6% -0.1%  2.7%  0.6% -0.2%  0.6% 
HH  20-30% 3.2% 0.0%  3.2%  3.2% -0.1%  3.4%  0.7% -0.2%  0.7% 
HH  30-40% 3.0% 0.0%  3.0%  2.9% -0.1%  3.2%  0.6% -0.2%  0.6% 
HH  40-50% 3.2% 0.1%  3.2%  2.9% -0.1%  3.4%  0.6% -0.2%  0.7% 
HH  50-60% 3.1% 0.1%  3.1%  2.7% -0.1%  3.3%  0.6% -0.2%  0.6% 
HH 60-70%  3.0%  0.1%  3.0%  2.4%  0.0%  3.1%  0.5%  -0.1%  0.6% 
HH 70-80%  2.6%  0.1%  2.6%  1.9%  0.0%  2.7%  0.4%  -0.1%  0.5% 
HH  80-90% 2.0% 0.1%  2.0%  0.9% 0.0%  2.0%  0.2% 0.0%  0.4% 
HH  90-95% 1.7% 0.2%  1.7%  0.5% 0.1%  1.7%  0.1% 0.0%  0.3% 
HH 95-
96.25% 
1.7% 0.2%  1.7%  0.7% 0.1%  1.8%  0.1% 0.0%  0.3% 
HH 96.25-
97.5% 
1.5% 0.3%  1.5%  0.4% 0.2%  1.4%  0.1% 0.0%  0.2% 
HH 97.5-
98.75% 
1.6% 0.2%  1.6%  0.2% 0.1%  1.4%  0.1% 0.0%  0.2% 
HH 98.75-
100% 
1.3% 0.3%  1.3%  -0.2% 0.2%  0.7%  0.0% 0.0%  0.1% 





























Figure 1: Labour demand analysis – market for unskilled workers 
 



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Deficit finance Balanced budget Targeted subsidy